

Party Responsiveness and Mandate Balancing^{*}

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Abstract

Recent evidence suggests that parties are *responsive* to elections, adjusting their post-electoral policies in the direction of the winner and in proportion to the margin of victory. If voters believe that parties are responsive, then they may have an incentive to vote strategically. Specifically, those who prefer moderate policies have an incentive to engage in *mandate balancing*, the act of voting for the party expected to lose in order to reduce the margin of victory. Using a nationally-representative sample in the U.S., we test voter beliefs and study the effect of these beliefs on vote choice behavior. We find that many voters believe that parties are responsive to vote share, and this belief causes nonpartisans to be significantly more likely than partisans to vote against the winner as the expected margin of victory increases.

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Recent theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that parties in the U.S. respond to elections by changing the candidates they choose and the policies they implement (Conley 2001; Fowler 2005; Fowler and Smirnov 2005; Smirnov and Fowler 2004). Specifically, *both* the winning and losing parties become more liberal when the Democrats win, more conservative when the Republicans win, and the size of the change in ideology is increasing in the size of the margin of victory. However, the possible existence of these party dynamics begs an important question. Do *voters* believe that parties and politicians are responsive to elections? And if so, how do these beliefs affect voter behavior?

A number of recent formal models depend on the assumption that voters believe parties adjust their post-electoral policies in response to the margin of victory. For example, Razin (2003) and Fowler and Smirnov (2003) show that under this assumption, moderate voters who must choose between two responsive and polarized parties have a *signaling* motivation to vote that is much stronger than the motivation to affect the outcome of the election. Shotts (2000) notes further that voters may have an incentive to signal their preferences for moderate policies through abstention, even when the act of voting is costless. Meirowitz and Tucker (2003) show that “voting to send a message” to responsive parties causes split ticket voting in sequential elections, especially if the sequence involves the alternation of low and high stakes elections (see also Alesina and Rosenthal 1995). Meirowitz (2004) further extends these results from elections to polls, showing that if voters believe parties respond to vote intention surveys by adjusting their policies, then polling results cannot be a reliable measure of public opinion.

The unifying message from these formal models is that a belief in responsive parties gives voters an incentive to behave strategically in contests between two alternatives. Specifically, we should expect different behavior from extremist and moderate voters. Both

kinds of voters want their preferred candidate to win, and thus have an incentive to vote sincerely. However, they also have an incentive to move post-electoral policy as close to their own preferred outcome as possible. Extremists experience no conflict between these incentives. Each vote for the preferred party increases the probability of victory and moves post-electoral policy closer to their ideal point. Moderates, on the other hand, must consider a tradeoff. If they believe that larger margins of victory cause the winning party to offer more extreme policies, then they may signal their preference for more centrist policies by voting for the expected loser—even if it means voting for their second choice. We call this type of strategic behavior *mandate balancing*.

In this article we report the results of experiments conducted on a nationally-representative sample of respondents in the U.S. that were designed to assess voter beliefs about party responsiveness and the impact of these beliefs on voter behavior. We find that voters tend to think that the electoral margin of victory affects policies and candidates offered by both parties—larger margins cause the winner to become more extreme and the loser more moderate. Moreover, partisanship helps to explain variation in these beliefs. Republican voters tend to believe that Democratic policies and candidates are much more responsive to vote share than policies and candidates offered by the Republican party. Meanwhile, voters from both parties tend to think that Republican candidates are less responsive than their Democratic counterparts. Although these results might seem counterintuitive, they are consistent with the debate over “flip-flopping” in the 2004 Presidential election and they highlight the fact that responsiveness has two very different normative interpretations. Although the literature on responsiveness typically views responsive parties as more “democratic” (Stokes 1999), expectations of

responsiveness may also reflect the view that a party is unprincipled (Fenno 1986) or primarily office-motivated, willing to change dramatically to become more competitive.

We also find evidence that is consistent with predictions of strategic voting by moderates. Subjects typically respond to expected vote share in our experiments by bandwagoning—larger margins of victory elicit greater support for the winning candidate. However, subjects who do not consider themselves Democrats or Republicans exhibit significantly different behavior. As predicted by the theory of *mandate balancing*, nonpartisans were more likely than partisans to vote against the winner as the margin of victory increases. One possible alternative interpretation of this finding is that nonpartisans always prefer to vote against the party in power. However, we show that only those who believe parties are responsive tend to vote against the party expected to win. Thus, these results conform to predictions from the formal theory literature that beliefs about party behavior in certain instances may yield strategic voting, even in two candidate elections.

Vote Share, Electoral Mandates, and Mandate Balancing

Smirnov and Fowler (2004) and Fowler and Smirnov (2005) show that one result of competition between policy-motivated parties under uncertainty (Calvert 1985; Roemer 2001; Wittman 1977) is that winning parties should move towards the extremes to satisfy their own preferences while losers should move towards the center in order to improve their chances of winning the next election. This is because election results give parties information about the location of the median voter. Intuitively, in a two-candidate contest on a single dimension, parties know that the median voter is closer to the winning candidate than the losing candidate. They also know that the median voter is closer to the candidate who wins by a wide margin than

a candidate who only barely wins against the same opponent. Therefore, when parties observe an election outcome they should update their beliefs about the location of the median voter in the direction of the winning party's preference and in proportion to the margin of victory.

Parties react to these updated beliefs by shifting *with* the median voter. For example, if the left wins a close election, both parties will update their beliefs about the location of the voter slightly to the left and may offer slightly more liberal candidates in the next election. If the left wins in a landslide, candidates from both parties will be noticeably more liberal in the next election. In support of this theory, Conley (2001) provides evidence that Presidents try to implement more extreme policies after landslide elections, Fowler (2005) shows that the ideology of US Senate candidates is significantly related to previous election outcomes, and Fowler (2006) shows that markets expect the government to enact larger policy changes when the President wins in a landslide.

Suppose voters believe that both parties are responsive to vote share, shifting left when the left wins and right when the right wins in proportion to the margin of victory. What impact would these beliefs have on voter behavior? A number of formal models suggest that beliefs about party responsiveness will cause some voters to engage in strategic behavior (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Fowler and Smirnov 2003; Meirowitz 2004; Meirowitz and Tucker 2003; Piketty 2000; Razin 2003; Shotts 2000). Here we consider a specific kind of strategic voting implied by several of these models. Suppose voters want to minimize the distance between their ideal policy and the policy offered by the party that wins the election. Consider, first, the incentives facing left extremists with ideal points located to the left of the policies offered by both of the parties. These individuals have an incentive to vote for the left party because it will improve their chance of winning. Moreover, each additional vote that party gets will cause the

post-electoral policies of *both parties* to shift a small amount to the left. Thus, there is no conflict between the effect of the vote on the probability of winning and the “signaling” effect of the vote on the margin of victory. The same reasoning applies to right extremists—they will have both an electoral and a “signaling” motivation to vote for the right candidate.

The decision is not so simple for *moderates* with ideal points located between the policies offered by the two parties. These individuals will have the same incentive as extremists to vote for the closest party to improve the probability that the preferred party wins the election. However, each additional vote gained by the winning party also moves the winning post-electoral policy farther away from the moderate’s ideal point. Thus, moderates may have an incentive to vote for their second choice if they think their first choice is likely to win the election by a wide margin. We call this effect “mandate balancing,” or the tendency by moderates to use their votes to reduce the margin of victory for the winning party.

Mandate balancing is the mirror image of another widely-noted discrepancy in the model of citizens as sincere proximity voters. The literature on “protest voting” suggests that some citizens vote for a party other than their first choice in order to send a signal to one or both parties (Heath and Evans 1994; Niemi, Whitten, and Franklin 1992). However, protest voting in the American context often refers to extremists choosing a more extreme third party in order to signal their frustration with the centripetal tendencies of the closest mainstream party. While protest voting is often about the attempt by extremists to pull the mainstream parties outwards, mandate balancing is about the attempt by moderates to pull them inwards.

Party Dynamics and Voter Behavior: An Experiment

In order to assess voter beliefs about party responsiveness and the effect on their behavior, we conduct an experiment on a nationally-representative sample of respondents provided by Time-Sharing Experiments in the Social Sciences (TESS). This experiment seeks to test two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that voters believe that an increase in the margin of victory in an election causes a) the winning party to support more extreme policies and candidates and b) the losing party to support more moderate policies and candidates. If this hypothesis is true and if self-identified Democrats and Republicans are more likely to have extreme ideal points than nonpartisans¹, then we should expect to see an important difference in voting behavior between partisans and nonpartisans. Democrats and Republicans want their party to win by as much as possible, but nonpartisans who think their favorite candidate is likely to win may have an incentive to switch their vote in order to moderate the election outcome. This suggests a second hypothesis, that nonpartisans who believe that parties respond to vote share are more likely to support the candidate expected to lose as the margin of victory increases.

In each experiment, subjects are asked to imagine a hypothetical future U.S. Presidential election. They are then given a stimulus that concerns the vote share they expect in that election. Some subjects are told to expect landslides. Others are told to expect a close election. To ensure variation in expectations, we draw each voter's belief about expected Democratic vote share from a uniform distribution between 35% and 65%. Subjects are asked who they would vote for

¹ We do not have information about candidate or self-placement on the liberal conservative scale in the TESS data, but we do have data from the National Election Studies. The NES cumulative file shows that nonpartisans are significantly more likely than partisans to self-identify as “moderate, middle of the road” (20.1% vs. 14.2%).

in the election and then they are asked to predict how both parties will react to the election outcome. Will Republican and/or Democratic *policies* become more liberal or conservative? Will Republican and/or Democratic *candidates* become more liberal or conservative? Answers to these questions will help to establish whether voters expect parties to shift in the direction of the winner and in proportion to the magnitude of victory, and whether those who have these expectations are more likely to vote strategically.

Randomization ensures that responses generate information about how the population as a whole perceives party dynamics and how it affects their behavior on average. However, it is possible that some subjects are more likely than others to perceive party dynamics and react to them. Therefore, the survey includes a within-subject component. Subjects are asked to imagine a *second* hypothetical US Presidential election with a different randomly drawn stimulus, and then all the previous questions are repeated. At the end of the session, subjects are asked a standard question to determine with which party they identify.


The experimental approach offers an important advantage. One of the difficulties in using a real election to study the effect of voter expectations on voter behavior is the tendency of partisans to overestimate the probability their preferred party will win. For example, 25% of respondents in the 1976, 1980, 1984, and 1988 National Election Study (NES) said they expected their preferred party to win easily while only 6% expected the opponent to win easily. In contrast, randomization of the vote share stimulus ensures that expectations will not be correlated with partisanship and makes it possible to estimate the uncontaminated effect of these expectations on voter behavior. If voters change their response to the vote intention question when we change the vote share stimulus, it may indicate that the margin of victory affects voter behavior in the way posited above.

Results: Voter Beliefs

In January 2005 TESS contracted Knowledge Networks to field a survey instrument (see the Appendix) by Internet to 1226 adults, 820 of whom completed the survey. Random digit dialing was used to recruit subjects who were then offered free Internet service and equipment in exchange for participation in surveys. To achieve a nationally-representative sample, Knowledge Networks calculates post stratification weights by comparing sample and Census data on gender, age, race, region, and education. Overall, internet surveys using this methodology have been shown to be somewhat more reliable than telephone surveys (Huggins and Eyerman 2001; Krosnick and Chang 2001).

Figure 1 shows the within-subject relationship in the raw data between the vote share stimulus and the expected shift in policies and candidates by both parties. The horizontal axis represents the change in the expected vote share for the Republican candidate between the first experiment and the second experiment. For example, if the stimulus in the first experiment is to expect the Republican to win 40% of the vote and the stimulus in the second experiment is to expect the Republican to win 55%, then the difference would be +15. The vertical axis represents the change in the expected shift in policies or candidates for each of the parties. There are five increasing categories of shifts, “much more liberal”, “somewhat more liberal”, “about the same”, “somewhat more conservative”, and “much more conservative”. The difference reflects the change in categories from one experiment to another, with positive numbers indicating a change in the conservative direction. For example, if in the first experiment the subject expects the Democratic party to offer “somewhat more liberal” policies and in the second she expects the Democratic party to offer “somewhat more conservative policies”, then the difference would be +2.

Figure 1. Impact of Expected Vote Share on Beliefs about Party Dynamics



Note: Circle size proportional to number of observations at a given point. Lines show mean effect of change in vote share on change in party behavior, calculated using local regression with 95% confidence intervals. Expected Shift in party behavior is coded as follows: 1=much more liberal; 2=somewhat more liberal; 3=about the same; 4=somewhat more conservative; 5=much more conservative. *Change in Expected Shift* is difference between respondent's expectation in experiment 1 and experiment 2.

The circles in each graph in Figure 1 are proportional in size to the number of data points at each location and the lines represent a smoothed local regression (Loader 1999) with 95% confidence intervals. If voters tend to expect parties to shift in the direction and magnitude of the vote share, we would expect a trendline in the data to slope up and to the right—Republican losses should increase the likelihood of liberal (downward) shifts and Republican gains should increase the likelihood of conservative (upward) shifts. In fact, this is exactly what we see. The policies and candidates of both parties are expected to become more conservative as vote share for the Republicans increases. The expectation appears to be weakest for Republican candidates (lower right of Figure 1) suggesting that voters think Republican politicians are less responsive than their Democratic peers.

Table 1 shows four within-subject statistical models of expectations of party behavior. In these models the expectation of party behavior in the second experiment is regressed on the change in vote share and the party behavior expected in the first experiment. Although these models assume an OLS form, other specifications using ordered logit form (not shown) yield substantively similar results and suggest that category thresholds are approximately equidistant as implied in the OLS model. The positive and strongly significant coefficient on change in expected Republican vote share across all four models indicates that subjects expect *both* Democrats and Republicans to offer more conservative *candidates* and more conservative *policies* as the Republican vote share increases. To provide a sense of the size of the effect, the first model in Table 1 suggests that a 25% increase in vote share for the Republicans causes voters to expect Democratic policies to become about half a category more conservative.

Table 1. Expectations of Party Behavior

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Dependent Variables</i>			
	Democratic Policies	Republican Policies	Democratic Candidates	Republican Candidates
Expectation of Party Behavior in First Experiment	0.52 (0.04)	0.51 (0.04)	0.48 (0.04)	0.57 (0.04)
Change in Expected Republican Vote Share	2.01 (0.32)	1.37 (0.29)	1.91 (0.28)	0.73 (0.24)
Constant	-0.11 (0.04)	0.09 (0.04)	-0.10 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Adjusted R^2	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.32
N	404	392	403	396

Note: Dependent variable is expectation of party behavior in Experiment 2 (coded as follows: 1=much more liberal; 2=somewhat more liberal; 3=about the same; 4=somewhat more conservative; 5=much more conservative). Coefficient estimates derived from weighted OLS with nationally-representative sample weights. $p < 0.01$ for all variables in the model.

Although both parties are believed to be responsive, there appears to be an expectation that Democrats are *more* responsive than Republicans. We take a closer look at this difference in Table 2 and find that the result is largely driven by Republican respondents. In these models we estimate the separate expectations of Republicans, Democrats, and nonpartisans by including a dummy variable for Republicans and nonpartisans and interacting these with the vote share variable. The coefficients on the vote share variable in Table 2 indicate Democratic voter beliefs and suggest that they believe that the candidates and policies of both parties are responsive. However, the coefficients on the interactions suggest that *Republican* voters expect *Democratic* policies and candidates to shift significantly more in response to vote share.

One might expect voters to believe their own party is more responsive—after all, party responsiveness is often cited as a normatively advantageous feature of democratic government (Stokes 1999). However, parties are also frequently criticized for paying *too much* attention to the desires of the electorate. If politicians change their stance in response to public opinion, they may appear unprincipled (Fenno 1986) and willing to do or say anything in order to gain office. Our survey was in the field about two months after the 2004 Presidential election. In the 2004 campaign, the Republican incumbent, George Bush, effectively exerted a great deal of effort in portraying the Democratic challenger, John Kerry, as a “flip-flopper” who changed his positions on issues (especially the Iraq war) when they became unpopular (Cave 2004). This portrayal may have continued to resonate among Republicans at the time of our survey, influencing their expectations of the behavior of future Democratic candidates.

Table 2. Expectations of Party Behavior by Partisan Identification

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>Dependent Variables</i>			
	Democratic Policies	Republican Policies	Democratic Candidates	Republican Candidates
Expectation of Party Behavior in First Experiment	0.51 (0.04)	0.51 (0.04)	0.48 (0.04)	0.59 (0.05)
Change in Expected Republican Vote Share	1.16 (0.49)	1.60 (0.49)	1.33 (0.43)	0.94 (0.40)
Change in Expected Republican Vote Share * Nonpartisan	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.88 (0.69)	0.52 (0.64)	-0.47 (0.57)
Change in Expected Republican Vote Share * Republican	2.21 (0.73)	0.20 (0.79)	1.52 (0.67)	-0.06 (0.61)
Nonpartisan	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.20 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.02 (0.07)
Republican	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.07)
Constant	-0.09 (0.06)	0.15 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.05)	0.07 (0.04)
Adjusted R^2	0.28	0.29	0.27	0.32
N	404	392	403	396

Note: Dependent variable is expectation of party behavior in Experiment 2 (coded as follows: 1=much more liberal; 2=somewhat more liberal; 3=about the same; 4=somewhat more conservative; 5=much more conservative). Coefficient estimates derived from weighted OLS with nationally-representative sample weights. $p < 0.05$ for all coefficients in first two rows and first and third coefficients in fourth row.

Results: Vote Choice

Voters clearly expect parties to respond to elections, but to what extent does this affect their voting behavior? To answer this question, we divide subjects into those who believe parties are responsive and those who do not. About 28.2% of the subjects changed their expectations for shifts in party policy in the same direction as the change in vote share. This fraction probably represents a lower bound on the percentage of people who believe parties are responsive, since several subjects received two vote share stimuli that did not differ by much. However, we can use this distinction to test whether beliefs about party behavior influence vote choice.

Specifically, we would like to see if nonpartisans who believe parties are responsive are more likely than partisans to vote against the winner as their vote share increases. Model 1 in Table 3 shows how Republican vote share affects vote choice. Here the subject's vote intention in the second experiment is regressed on vote intention in the first experiment and the interaction of change in expected Republican vote share and a dummy variable for nonpartisans who believe parties are responsive. The only thing that changes between the two experiments is the expected vote share for the Republicans, so if there is a significant relationship between the vote share stimulus and the vote intention response, then it suggests that expectations about the election influence vote choice. Notice first that the coefficient on change in vote share is positive and significant. Since subjects have very little information about the candidates in these hypothetical elections, they may be using the vote share variable as a signal of candidate quality. If so, they would tend to bandwagon with the majority, becoming more likely to vote for the Republican as Republican vote share increases. However, the behavior of independents who believe parties are responsive is significantly different with respect to vote share. The coefficient on the interaction term is *negative*, suggesting that independents who believe parties are responsive become more

Table 3. Effect of Vote Share on Vote Choice

<i>DV: Second Vote Choice</i>	<i>Model 1</i>			<i>Model 2</i>		
	<i>Coef</i>	<i>S.E.</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Coef</i>	<i>S.E.</i>	<i>p</i>
<i>Responsive, Nonpartisan *</i> <i>Change in Vote Share</i>	-0.78	0.37	0.03	-0.75	0.37	0.05
<i>Change in Vote Share</i>	0.35	0.12	0.00	0.32	0.14	0.02
<i>Responsive, Nonpartisan</i>	0.02	0.06	0.77	0.02	0.06	0.70
<i>First Vote Choice</i>	0.90	0.01	0.00	0.90	0.01	0.00
<i>Nonresponsive, Nonpartisan *</i> <i>Change in Vote Share</i>				0.15	0.28	0.60
<i>Nonresponsive, Nonpartisan</i>				0.02	0.04	0.49
<i>Constant</i>	0.20	0.03	0.00	0.20	0.04	0.00
<i>R</i> ²	0.86			0.86		

Note: Dependent variable is vote choice in second experiment (coded 1 if respondent “definitely” chooses the Democrat, 2 if “probably” chooses Democrat, 3 if “probably” chooses Republican, 4 if “definitely” chooses Republican). Coefficient estimates derived from weighted GLM with a logit link function using nationally-representative sample weights.

likely than partisans to vote for the Democrat as the Republican gains more vote share. This indicates that independents are engaging in *mandate balancing*, voting strategically to reduce the winner's margin of victory.

One possible alternative hypothesis is that nonpartisans are not necessarily ideologically moderates and instead they just like to express opposition to the dominant party or parties. If this were true, then a belief in party responsiveness would make no difference—all independents would tend to vote against the winner. In contrast, the mandate balancing hypothesis suggests that the only nonpartisans who have an incentive to vote against the winner are those who think parties will shift policies after the election in response to the vote share. Model 2 in Table 2 adds a second interaction dummy for vote share that identifies nonpartisans who do *not* believe parties are responsive. The coefficient on this interaction term is not significant and is actually weakly positive. This suggests that the strategic behavior of nonpartisans depends on their belief about party responsiveness as predicted by the mandate balancing hypothesis.

Conclusion

Political behavior is shaped by beliefs about how politics works. To understand political behavior, we need to know what people believe about the political process. In this article, we examine voter beliefs about party responsiveness and how such beliefs affect voting behavior. Our findings have important implications for the study of party and candidate behavior. The assumption that voters believe in responsive politicians is vital for a number of recent formal models of electoral competition (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Fowler and Smirnov 2003; Meirowitz 2004; Meirowitz and Tucker 2003; Piketty 2000; Razin 2003; Shotts 2000). This article provides evidence that such an assumption can be supported empirically.

Specifically, we find that voters tend to believe that the policies and candidates of both parties respond to past election results. However, Republican voters appear to believe even more strongly than Democratic voters that the Democratic party is responsive. This asymmetry may seem counterintuitive since responsiveness is often seen as a positive aspect of democratic government (Stokes 1999). However, responsiveness also implies a readiness to compromise one's positions in order to remain competitive in an election. Since the survey was conducted in January 2005, many Republican voters may have continued to be affected by an electoral campaign that described Democrats and John Kerry as "flip-floppers." Future work should thus revisit this effect to see if it endures.

Finally, we test an important empirical implication of these models which suggests that some voters may vote strategically. Voting for the winner causes the winning platform to be adjusted further *away* from the center. Thus, moderates may have a "signaling" incentive to choose the party that is more likely to lose in order to keep the winning party from straying too far away from the voter's ideal point. We call this phenomenon *mandate balancing*. Our results indicate that nonpartisan voters are more likely than partisans to switch their vote to the loser as the margin of victory increases. While it is possible that this reflects an anti-partisan stance by nonpartisans, this is unlikely since only those nonpartisans who believe in responsive parties exhibit a tendency to vote strategically. If nonpartisans tend to prefer moderate policies, then these results are supportive of the mandate balancing theory.

Appendix. TESS Survey Instrument

Imagine it is the year 2016. Suppose a U.S. Presidential election is about to be held in which the two main candidates are a liberal Democrat and a conservative Republican. Given what you know about the election from media reports, poll results, and personal conversations, suppose that you expect...

[Draw a random integer v uniformly distributed from 35 to 65. If $v < 50$, give stimulus A. If $v > 50$, give stimulus B. If $v = 50$, give stimulus C.]

Stimulus A: *the Democrat to receive $[v]$ percent of the vote and the Republican to receive only $[1-v]$ percent of the vote in the upcoming election.*

Stimulus B: *the Republican to receive $[1-v]$ percent of the vote and the Democrat to receive only $[v]$ percent of the vote in the upcoming election.*

Stimulus C: *the Democrat and Republican each to receive 50 percent of the vote in the upcoming election.*

Main Questions

Suppose you decide to vote.

1) Would you choose the Democrat or the Republican? (I definitely would choose the Democrat/I probably would choose the Democrat/I probably would choose the Republican/I definitely would choose the Republican)

[Randomly choose question 2a or 2b. Randomly choose question 3a or 3b. Then randomize the order of these two randomly chosen questions]

Suppose the election occurs just as you expected. The Democrat receives $[v]$ percent of the vote and the Republican receives $[1-v]$ percent of the vote. How do you think the election results will affect policies supported by Republicans?

2a) Republican politicians will try to enact laws that are (much more liberal, somewhat more liberal, about the same, somewhat more conservative, much more conservative).

Suppose the election occurs just as you expected. The Democrat receives $[v]$ percent of the vote and the Republican receives $[1-v]$ percent of the vote. How do you think the election results will affect policies supported by Democrats?

2b) Democratic politicians will try to enact laws that are (much more liberal, somewhat more liberal, about the same, somewhat more conservative, much more conservative).

Suppose the election occurs just as you expected. The Democrat receives $[v]$ percent of the vote and the Republican receives $[1-v]$ percent of the vote. How do you think the election results will affect future Republican candidates?

3a) In future elections, Republican candidates will be (much more liberal, somewhat more liberal, about the same, somewhat more conservative, much more conservative).

Suppose the election occurs just as you expected. The Democrat receives $[v]$ percent of the vote and the Republican receives $[1-v]$ percent of the vote. How do you think the election results will affect future Democratic candidates?

3b) In future elections, Democratic candidates will be (much more liberal, somewhat more liberal, about the same, somewhat more conservative, much more conservative).

Imagine it is the year 2024. Suppose a different U.S. Presidential election is about to be held in which the two main candidates are a Democrat and a Republican. Given what you know about the election from media reports, poll results, and personal conversations, suppose that in this new election you expect...

[Repeat experiment a second time with new randomly drawn stimulus. Repeat questions 1-3 (keep the same randomly drawn questions in 2 and 3) and number them 4-6]

7) Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an independent?

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